mathematicians’ perspectives on the transition to
formal proof
Lara Alcock
Graduate
1. Introduction and
research context
The research
reported here addresses the theme of the transition to proof, via the
perspectives of mathematicians who teach a course entitled “Introduction to
Mathematical Reasoning”. This course is
taught in a standard lecture-based format at a large state university in the
The participants spoke about many aspects
of the course, including issues of ongoing assessment and their own
disagreements about whether the course should be more axiomatic or more
investigative. This paper focuses first
on cognitive issues, citing four modes of thinking used by successful provers,
each of which has a distinct associated goal.
These emerged from analysis of the participants’ comments on the
differences between their own thinking and that of their students. It then notes that in teaching, emphasis on
one mode tends to predominate. It
concludes by offering comments on the interdependence of the modes and asking
whether a more balanced approach might be appropriate.
2. Four modes of thinking
The
four modes of thinking are:
2.1 Instantiation
The goal of
the instantiation mode is to meaningfully understand a mathematical statement
by thinking about the objects to which it applies. Professor 1 describes this as a natural
response to a new definition.
P1: …what happens is you
know that you describe a new definition, you say “let f be a function, let x be
a real number, we say that…” and then “some relationship between f and x holds if, blah blah blah.”
So then what they have to do, they have to realize that this definition
only makes sense in the context of, I have to have a function in mind and I
have to have a [number] in mind…
Dahlberg and
Housman (1997) also consider this a strong approach to handling a new
definition. Professor 1 notes, however,
that his students often do not engage in such thinking.
P1: And what they’ll do is typically if you have a sequence, you know, if I have a sequence definition to use in the rest of the problem, and they don’t understand the definition, they’ll just skip that sentence and go on. I will…they will come in for help on a problem, and five or ten minutes into the discussion I’ll realize that, that they never bothered to process this particular definition. They have no idea what this means.
2.2 Structural thinking
The goal of
structural thinking is to generate a proof for a statement by using its formal
structure. Professor 3 considers this a
sensible first approach when trying to construct a proof.
P3: …to try to get as much as possible, you know as many ideas as possible about how one should go about writing a proof, by…just looking at, at the sentence, what it says and what its logical structure is.
Selden and
Selden use similar ideas in discussing how an individual validates a proof
(Selden & Selden, 2003). Professor 3
notes, however, that students lack the experience that would help them to
proceed in this way.
P3:
And the main obstacle is,
that the students…most students don’t seem to have had any courses in English
grammar, in anything else that might
teach them how to think in terms of structures, logical structures.
More
specifically, students are also often unaware of the mathematical conventions
for interpreting connectives and quantifiers.
Professor 2 offers this comment (among others) on the errors that can
occur as a result of this.
P2: …but students who would say, “we want to prove this, so that” – it was never clear to me whether they meant “so we can conclude that”, or “so we need to verify that”. And there were a lot of proofs which would be correct, if I could only infer that they meant “so we need to verify…so we need to verify…so we need to verify…and then this last one is clearly true so everything stacks up.”
2.3 Creative thinking
Creative
thinking is a semantic mode, the goal of which is to examine instantiations of
mathematical objects in order to identify a property that can be used as the
“key idea” (in the sense of Raman, 2003) in a proof. This might be accomplished directly, by
experimenting with a particular example in the hope that one will find an
argument or sequence of manipulations that can be generalized. This is often cited as a strategy for finding
an induction argument.
P5: See if you can get from 2 to 3, if you can’t
get from n to n plus 1.
Alternatively
(in the case of a universal statement), it might be accomplished by attempting
to construct a counterexample, and attending to what prevents this.
P1: …the way I often think about a proof is that, you know you imagine this as, try to beat this. Meaning, try to find a counterexample. […] If you think about, if you think about the reason why you were failing to find a counterexample, okay, then, that sometimes gives you a clue, to why the thing is true.
There appear
to be two opposing obstacles that prevent students from using these strategies
successfully. One is that, as noted
above, they may not be inclined to think about examples at all. The other is that they may give examples
without articulating properties of these, either performing empirical checks or
relying on concept images (cf. Harel
& Sowder, 1998).
P3: So then I asked her in class, how do you know that 1997 is prime? The idea being that she would say “well I checked”, in which case I was going to answer, I was going to say “okay, you tell me that you have checked. But why should I accept that?” Okay? That was going to be the second part, but then I didn’t even get there because then she said, “It looks like a prime to me”. That’s what she said.
2.4 Critical thinking
The goal in
critical thinking is to check the correctness of assertions or deductions. This involves searching for possible
counterexamples, and/or checking for preservation of properties or for implied
properties that are false. Checking a
proof in this way is described by professor 1 as follows.
P1: …there is a locality principle about proofs, about every proof, and that is that we somehow recognize, that even though you’re proving some very specific thing, that there are portions in the argument. Each portion in the argument is actually doing something more general. […] And therefore I can do a local check on this part of the argument by thinking about that more general situation and doing, examples within that more general situation.
Johnson-Laird
& Hasson (2003) report that comparable counterexample checking is a
preferentially used way to determine that an inference is invalid.
Nevertheless, the professors in this study regularly express exasperation
at the fact that students appear not to make these checks and thus make claims
that are “obviously wrong”.
P3: For instance, problem: “Express the number 30 as the difference of two squares, or show that it cannot be done.” Answer: “It cannot be done because 30 is divisible by 6 and a number that is divisible by 6 cannot be written as the difference of two squares.” Well, 12 is 16 minus 4. Ah…take any number that’s a difference of two squares, multiply it by 36, you’ll get a number that’s the difference of two squares and is divisible by 6, so I mean…again I could give you loads of examples of the same kind.
3. Teaching emphasis
In this study,
it seemed that the majority of the teaching effort is directed toward improving
the skills needed for structural thinking.
The professors give rules and “templates” for constructing proofs and
for writing definitions, and employ a restricted vocabulary in order to help
students avoid errors that arise from inappropriate use of connectives and
quantifiers. In some cases, this is in a
deliberate effort to help students learn to operate in an axiomatic system.
P3: …my own idea as I
said is to try to, to tell them…to try to get them to operate in a very
systematic way, and systematically tell them that it’s for their own good. For example one of the purposes of having all
these rules, these very precise rules, is that you know that a proof is
supposed to be an argument that you give, that should convince me.
In other
cases, the professor began the course with the intent of structuring it around
investigations of interesting questions, but felt compelled to issue guidelines
in response to student errors.
P1: …every time the students demonstrate to me that they, that some completely natural logical thing to me, that I couldn’t imagine how anybody could fail – could make this kind of logical error. But they make it. Okay. So what that does is it causes me to institute some…rule that I announce to the class. Not being able to do this, or must do this or something like this. […] Okay…and…well, the problem is the more, the longer that I teach the course, the more of these I end up putting in.
The professors
do use tasks that address the other modes of thinking, requesting examples of
given constructs, encouraging an “exploration” phase before an attempt at a
written proof is begun, and requiring the identification of false statements
and provision of counterexamples.
However, these tend to be employed less systematically.
4. Interdependence of
thinking modes
In my view,
the most important thing to note about the modes of thinking described above is
their interdependence. An outline of a
proof attempt (for a general conditional statement) serves to illustrate the
way in which a successful prover may move quickly and flexibly from one to
another according to changing goals:
A focus on the
skills needed for structural thinking does not seem to be misguided, as
undoubtedly students need to learn to communicate using the linguistic
conventions of mathematics. However,
this study raises the question of the degree to which any approach to teaching
proof is balanced with respect to the four modes of thinking. In particular, as recommended by Weber
(2001), it seems that we might profitably investigate ways to foster the
strategic use of different modes according to changing goals.
References
Dahlberg, R.P. & Housman, D.L.,
(1997), “Facilitating learning events through example generation”, Educational Studies in Mathematics, 33,
283-299.
Glaser, B., (1992), Emergence vs. Forcing: Basics of Grounded Theory Analysis,
Sociology Press,
Harel, G. & Sowder, L., (1998),
“Students’ proof schemes: results from exploratory studies”, in A.H.
Schoenfeld, J. Kaput & E. Dubinsky (Eds.) CBMS Issues in Mathematics Education, 7, 234-283.
Johnson-Laird, P.N. & Hasson, U.,
(2003), “Counterexamples in sentential reasoning”, Memory & Cognition, 31(7), 1105-1113.
Raman,
M., (2003), “Key ideas: what are they and how can they help us understand how
people view proof?”, Educational Studies in Mathematics, 52, 319-325.
Selden,
J. & Selden, A., (2003), “Validation of proofs considered as texts: can
undergraduates tell whether an argument proves a theorem?”,
Journal for Research in Mathematics
Education, 34(1), 4-36.
Weber, K., (2001), “Student difficulty in
constructing proofs: the need for strategic knowledge”, Educational Studies in Mathematics, 48(1), 101-119.